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Abstract
The Saving Gateway is a government saving initiative aiming to kick-
start a saving habit for those on low incomes. Funds saved in a Sav-
ing Gateway account up to a monthly limit are matched by the gov-
ernment at a rate of £ 0.50 per £ 1 saved after two years. A Saving
Gateway account is embedded alongside an ordinary interest-bearing
account in a simple lifecycle savings model to assess the implications
of the scheme for optimal saving. Among the ndings are that, for
agents with access to credit, the Saving Gateway is associated with
a fall in saving during the life of the account and a rise in consump-
tion. However, the scheme increases saving by the credit constrained.
On their own, empirically plausible levels of habit formation in con-
sumption preferences have too small an e¤ect on saving to justify the
scheme.
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1 Introduction
In addition to evidence of an apparent savings gapa­ icting households in
the UK - around half of whom have less than £ 1,500 in savings according
to the 2006-07 Family Resources Survey (FRS) - there is evidence that the
problem is especially acute among low income households. For instance,
FRS data also show that 43 per cent of the lowest income households have
no savings or assets at all, compared with an average of 24 per cent across
all households (Kempson and Finney, 2009).
The former Labour government sought to address this problem through the
idea of asset-based welfare (HM Treasury, 2001a,b), which emphasises the
importance of asset-holding in determining individualseducation, employ-
ment, and wellbeing (Sherraden, 1991). In order to promote asset-based
welfare, the Labour government designed two principal initiatives: the Child
Trust Fund (launched in 2002) and the Saving Gateway. Although the newly
elected coalition government has announced its intention to end the Child
Trust Fund, the Saving Gateway will be launched in July 2010, having re-
ceived cross-party support during its passage through parliament. While
there remains an important debate as to the merits of asset-based welfare
more generally (see e.g. Emmerson and Wakeeld, 2001), this paper focuses
on its proposed implementation in the form of the Saving Gateway.
The Saving Gateway consists of an account that lasts for two years. Eligibility
for Saving Gateway accounts consists of those in receipt of the main means-
tested benets and credits.1 Each month, participants can deposit up to
£ 25 in a Saving Gateway account. Saving Gateway providers - initially the
Post O¢ ce and two high-street banks - have the option of paying interest
1The precise eligibility criteria are individuals in receipt of Income Support, Jobseekers
Allowance, Incapacity Benet, Severe Disablement Allowance, Carers Allowance, and
Child and Working Tax Credits (with income below a specied level - currently £ 16,040
per annum).
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on credit balances, but are not required to do so. Upon maturity of the
account, the government will match the qualifying balance at a rate of £ 0.50
per £ 1.00 saved, where the qualifying balance is the highest balance achieved
during the life of the account (excluding any interest). Withdrawals from the
account are permitted, but cannot exceed the credit balance of the account.
The design of the Saving Gateway, in particular the use of matching pay-
ments, is partly inuenced by experiments with Individual Development Ac-
counts (IDAs) in the USA. However, unlike IDAs, the Saving Gateway con-
tains no commitment to nancial education, and the proceeds of the Saving
Gateway account are unrestricted in use.
The stated aims of the Saving Gateway are to kick-start a saving habit
among working age people on lower incomesand to promote nancial in-
clusion by encouraging people to engage with mainstream nancial services
(HM Treasury, 2008). The rst aim is designed to exploit the idea that peo-
ple are susceptible to habit formation in their consumption behaviour, which
can be modelled as a latent dependency between present and past consump-
tion in utility. If agents with habit formation preferences can be induced
to increase their saving, even for only a short period, this can potentially
generate a lasting impact on their future saving behaviour.
The second aim is of diminished importance - and may even be redundant
- as, with benet books having been phased out, all persons eligible for a
Saving Gateway account must already have at least a (basic) bank account or
a Post O¢ ce Card Account (POCA). Therefore, if one views such products
as mainstream (there are over 4.7 million POCAs), then Saving Gateway
participants already have the level of engagement being sought.2
2More generally, the latest report of the Financial Inclusion Taskforce (2009) shows
that the number of households without access to a bank account of any kind fell from
1.8 million in 2002/03 to 0.69 million in 2007/08 for reasons unconnected to the Saving
Gateway. Of the 0.69 million unbanked customers, around 0.59 million have a POCA.
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The Saving Gateway has received a mixed response in the literature. The
scheme receives strong support from those who argue that existing incentives
in the form of tax relief on savings yield no benet to non-taxpayers (Alt-
mann, 2003); or who argue that the Saving Gateway can generate signicant
increases through time in the asset holdings of low income individuals (e.g.
Sodha and Lister, 2006).
On the other hand, the results of a large-scale pilot of the Saving Gateway
involving over 22,000 participants, uncovered only very limited evidence of
reduced consumption, and no discernible evidence of increased net worth,
among pilot participants (Harvey et al., 2007).3 Concerns have also been
raised about the targeting of the Saving Gateway, since a substantial minor-
ity of those on the lowest incomes have more than £ 500 in nancial assets
and, of the remainder, many may have good reasons for not saving (Em-
merson and Wakeeld, 2003). Using simple numerical examples, Emmerson
and Wakeeld (2003) also discuss ways in which the introduction of the Sav-
ing Gateway might a¤ect the optimal savings decisions of participants. In
particular, the authors argue that the scheme might provide incentives to
transfer existing assets into Saving Gateway accounts, and to borrow from
other sources in order to maximise the balance of the Saving Gateway ac-
count.
In this paper I extend the analysis of Emmerson and Wakeeld (2003) by
o¤ering a detailed appraisal of the implications of the Saving Gateway for op-
timal saving behaviour before, during, and after participation in the scheme.
I employ theoretical and simulation techniques to analyse a lifecycle model of
saving, extended to allow for the existence of the Saving Gateway. I analyse
the Saving Gateway under three main sets of assumptions: the baseline case
3An earlier, smaller-scale, pilot provides encouraging evidence regarding levels of sav-
ing in the Saving Gateway accounts themselves. However, the evaluation of the pilot
(Kempson, McKay and Collard, 2005) does not perform the types of test on net worth
and consumption needed to evaluate whether saving, broadly dened, increased.
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is that in which agents gain utility only from current consumption (no habit
formation) and are free of credit constraints, while the second case introduces
credit constraints. Given its importance to the rationale for the scheme - the
third case I consider is that in which agents exhibit habit formation prefer-
ences.
I compare policy outcomes under the Saving Gateway with those under a
benchmark do nothingoption. I also compare the outcomes of the Saving
Gateway relative to those generated by an alternative policy option that
entails the same level of subsidy to those on low incomes. In particular, I
analyse a one-o¤ lump-sum increase in the qualifying benets and credits
(the lump-sum option). This analysis extends the governments own formal
appraisal of the Saving Gateway (HM Treasury, 2008, pp. 37-42), which is
only against do nothing.
Quantitatively, the model suggests that the impact of the scheme on saving
behaviour depends in a complex way on the parameters of the model. Quali-
tatively, however, the model yields a number of clear ndings. First, if agents
have access to credit, I nd that the Saving Gateway is associated with re-
duced levels of asset-holding during the life of the Saving Gateway account -
implying that saving observed in the Saving Gateway is more than o¤set by
dissaving elsewhere. To the extent that agents are able to anticipate their
future participation in the Saving Gateway, the scale of this e¤ect is magni-
ed. By contrast, if agents are credit constrained, the scheme is associated
with an increase in asset-holding during the life of the account.
Second, the wealth e¤ect engendered by the matching payment results in an
increase in consumption in all periods beyond the life of the Saving Gateway
account. For those with access to credit, the increase in consumption occurs
from as early as the period in which the Saving Gateway account is opened.
Third, in spite of the prominence of habit e¤ects in the rationale for the Sav-
ing Gateway, I nd that the presence of either habit formation or durability
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in preferences has no important quantitative or qualitative implications for
the impact of the Saving Gateway on saving behaviour.
Last, notwithstanding the issues above, I nd that the Saving Gateway yields
higher levels of asset-holding over the remainder of the lifecycle as the gov-
ernment match is consumed. For credit constrained agents, this e¤ect ex-
ceeds that produced by the wealth e¤ect associated with the matching pay-
ments. However, for agents with access to credit, an identical outcome can
be achieved at a lower cost through a lump-sum transfer.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 motivates a lifecycle analysis
of the Saving Gateway. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 analyses the
implications for optimal saving of participation in the Saving Gateway, and
how these compare to those arising from a simple lump-sum transfer. Section
5 analyses the special case of the model with habit formation preferences.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Modelling the Saving Gateway
The paper utilises a simple lifecycle model of savings, a key feature of which
is that agents are assumed to be saving optimally at all points in the lifecycle,
including before the introduction of the Saving Gateway. However, it might
be argued that this feature of the lifecycle approach makes it inherently
unlikely to provide a positive assessment of a scheme aiming at kick-starting
a saving habit.
According to this view, a more favourable framework might be provided by
time inconsistent models of consumption with quasi-hyperbolic discounting
(e.g. Gruber and K½oszegi, 2004), in which some agents might not be saving
optimally before the scheme (they would like to save more than they actually
do). It remains debated, however, as to whether e¤ects due to bounded
self control are economically signicant: for instance, Scholz, Seshadri and
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Khitatrakun (2006) nd empirical evidence that the standard lifecycle model
is a powerful predictor of patterns in saving behaviour.
A further feature of the model is that the Saving Gateway is assumed to be
able to exploit preexisting features of agentspreferences (e.g. a susceptibility
to forming habits), but is not able to systematically change preferences. This
assumption corresponds the economic orthodoxy that preferences are xed
and unchallengeable axioms of an agents behaviour (Stigler and Becker,
1977).
An alternative viewpoint might be that the Saving Gateway is capable of
changing preferences. Against this viewpoint is the absence in the scheme
of provision for nancial education (despite it being a feature of the second
Saving Gateway pilot). There is evidence that nancial education, whether
provided through the workplace (Bernheim and Garrett, 2003) or through
schools (Bernheim, Garrett and Maki, 2001), has a positive e¤ect on individ-
ualssubsequent saving rates. Equally, however, the possibility of preference
change should not be dismissed, and I briey explore its implications in Sec-
tion 5.
3 Model
In this section I extend a simple lifecycle model of saving to allow for a
Saving Gateway account. Throughout the lifecycle, agents are assumed to
have access to a standard interest-bearing investment account (herein referred
to as the bankaccount), and, for a time-limited period, to have access to
a Saving Gateway account. During the life of the Saving Gateway account,
agents therefore have a choice of investment instruments, which allows an
analysis of not only saving behaviour in the Saving Gateway account, but
also how the presence of a Saving Gateway account potentially alters saving
behaviour in the bank account.
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There are three types of agent - borrowers, savers and the credit-constrained
- indexed by i = B; S;CC. Borrowers and savers are distinguished by a
per-period discount factor denoted i, but are otherwise identical in all other
respects. Under the do nothingoption savers optimally choose to hold a
positive asset balance in the bank account, while borrowers nd it optimal to
hold a strictly negative asset balance in the bank account. This necessarily
implies the restriction S > B. Credit constrained agents are distinguished
by having no access to credit on reasonable terms (they face a rate of interest
rCC !1 on debit balances).
As the Saving Gateway requires participants to make monthly saving deci-
sions, I take each period of the model to represent a month. Agents live for
n periods and receive an exogenous monthly income of y, used to nance
consumption cit. In each period, t, agents can choose to save an amount s
i
t
in the bank account. Savers receive a monthly rate of interest rS on credit
balances, while borrowers pay interest at a rate rB on debit balances, where
rB  rS. These assumptions are intentionally strong in order to focus at-
tention on the e¤ects on saving of participation in the Saving Gateway, and
eliminate complications due to retirement and uncertainty over lifespan and
income.4
The Saving Gateway account is opened in period t = a and matures in period
t = b (implying a duration of d  b   a + 1 periods). In the baseline case
I assume that agents are unaware of their future participation the Saving
Gateway prior to opening their account in period a. In Section 4.4 I relax
this assumption to explore the impact of agents anticipating their future
participation in the scheme.
During its life, agents can choose to save an amount git in the Saving Gate-
4A further motivation, not unimportant in practice, is the need to minimise the com-
plexity of the model to make simulation over a large number of periods computationally
feasible.
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way account in each period t, subject to the monthly cap git  g and the
requirement that withdrawals cannot exceed the credit balance of the ac-
count, git   
Pt 1
j=a g
i
j. The matching payment is made at time t = b+ 1 at
the rate m, where m exceeds the market rate of interest available to savers
(m > rS). To maximise the distinction between the two types of account,
I assume that credit balances in the Saving Gateway account do not earn
interest. This assumption also seems likely to be realistic as there are lim-
ited incentives for providers to increase further the already generous returns
o¤ered by the account.
Given these assumptions consumption can be written as:
cit =
8>><>>:
y + sit 1 (1 + ri)  sit t = 1; :::; a  1
y + sit 1 (1 + ri)  sit   git t = a; :::; b
y + sit 1 (1 + ri)  sit + (1 +m)maxjb
Pj
k=a g
i
k t = b+ 1
y + sit 1 (1 + ri)  sit t = b+ 2; ::; n
Agents act as if they maximise lifetime utility, in which case their problem
can be written as:
max
sit;g
i
t
nX
t=1
t 1i U

cit

subject to sit = s
i
t jg=0 for t < a, si0 = sin = 0, cit  0 and git 2 [ 
Pt 1
j=a g
i
j; g].
The rst constraint imposes that, prior to period a, saving behaviour cor-
responds to the equilibrium of the model under the do nothing option -
achieved by turning o¤the Saving Gateway (g = 0).
The Euler equations characterising an interior optimum for investment in
each type of account are:
sit : i (1 + ri) =
U 0[cit]
U 0[cit+1]
t = 1; :::; n  1
git : 
b t+1
i (1 +m) =
U 0[cit]
U 0[cib+1]
t = a; :::; b
. (1)
9
As I shall go on to discuss, however, the optimum involves a corner solution
for at least one of (sit; g
i
t), so the two Euler equations in (1) do not hold simul-
taneously. While the Euler equations for sit have a familiar interpretation,
it is instructive to interpret those for git. They show that when investing in
period t, an agent must wait (b  t+ 1) periods to obtain the matched pay-
ment. This implies that, even in a world of certainty, the underlying incentive
to save in the Saving Gateway is not constant over time. For instance, saving
£ 25 in t = a yields a nal sum (after matching) of £ 37.50 two years hence,
equivalent to an annual percentage rate (APR) of 22.5 per cent. Conversely,
investing £ 25 in t = b yields £ 37.50 the very next month, equivalent to an
APR of 12,875 per cent.
In this sense, although the matching payments made under the Saving Gate-
way can be converted in to an implied interest rate - 44.4 per cent for an
agent contributing the maximum £ 25 each month - the underlying incentives
to save generated by matching are quite di¤erent to those generated by the
payment of interest.
3.1 Simulation
To help elucidate implications of the Euler equations in (1) I perform sim-
ulations of the model. A di¢ culty with allowing periods to correspond to
months is that the full post-educational lifecycle requires over 700 periods.
For computational reasons, I restrict the simulation to 200 periods, which
somewhat exaggerates the duration of the Saving Gateway as a proportion
of the lifecycle, but nevertheless preserves the intuition that it is small.
Utility in period t is given by U [ct] = log [ct]. The choice of utility function is
informed by a number of factors. First, the logarithmic specication exhibits
prudence in the sense of Kimball (1990) and is therefore consistent with evi-
dence of precautionary saving. Second, economic theory provides no a-priori
presumption that o¤ering a high rate of matching acts as an incentive to
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save, due to opposing income and substitution e¤ects. While many econo-
mists think the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) is positive, the
empirical evidence is mixed at best: many studies nd evidence that the EIS
is zero (e.g. Hall, 1988).
If the EIS is zero, or even negative, it is immediate that the Saving Gateway
will fail to increase saving, as indeed Engen, Gale and Scholz (1996) argue is
true of most saving incentives. However, logarithmic utility presents a more
interesting case as it implies a unit EIS - a feature that is also consistent
with the ndings of recent empirical studies (e.g. Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002).
Given logarithmic utility, under the do nothingoption an agent will hold
a positive level of assets in the bank account if  > (1 + rS)
 1; a zero level
of assets in the bank account if  2 (1 + rB) 1 ; (1 + rS) 1; and a negative
level of assets if  < (1 + rB)
 1. I therefore set:
S = (1 + rS)
 1 + ; B = (1 + rB)
 1   ;
where  > 0 is a constant. For credit constrained agents, the most interesting
case to consider is that in which they enter the Saving Gateway with no
accumulated stock of assets. I therefore assume CC = (1 + rS)
 1.
Based on current UK capital market conditions I assume a 2 per cent APR
on assets held in the bank account (implying rS  0:0017), and an APR
of 17 per cent (implying rB  0:0132) on funds borrowed from the bank
account. The latter rate is typical of what is presently o¤ered on UK credit
card borrowing. For  = 0:0001 these rates of return yield S  0:998 and
B  0:987. These estimates fall either side of Samwicks (1998) empirical
estimate of  = 0:993 for the median rate of time preference in the 1992
Survey of Consumer Finances.
Given that the Saving Gateway is explicitly aimed at those below retirement
age, I assume that agents participate in the Saving Gateway in the rst half
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of the lifecycle (a = 30). In principle, agents can choose the optimal time
at which to take up their eligibility for the Saving Gateway. Since time is
discounted, there is an incentive to participate at the earliest possible op-
portunity, however, this might be o¤set by the desire to build-up an existing
stock of assets so as to maximise contributions to the scheme while minimis-
ing the requirement to borrow. However, I choose not to optimise explicitly
on the parameter a, as to do so in a sensible fashion would require a much
more detailed specication of model than that employed here.
Based on the prevailing level of UK benets, I assume a monthly net income
y = $400, though it is accepted that recipients of tax credits, in particular,
could be earning well in excess of this sum, while those on, for instance,
Jobseekers Allowance could be earning somewhat less. The remaining para-
meters are set to mirror the actual design of the Saving Gateway, so d = 24,
m = 0:5, and g = 25.
4 Analysis
4.1 Contributions to the Saving Gateway Account
To analyse the level and timing of contributions to the Saving Gateway ac-
count it is instructive to begin by considering behaviour at t = b, as invest-
ing in the Saving Gateway account a single period prior to the receipt of the
matching payment is equivalent to investing in the bank account, except that
the implied rate of return is m. For savers with an existing stock of assets it
is therefore always possible to increase cb+1, holding cb constant, by dissaving
in the bank account at rate rS and placing these assets in the Saving Gateway
at rate m (a borrow-to-save strategy). Since m > rS, the matching payment
in period b + 1 exceeds the costs associated with dissaving in period b. The
only di¤erence for agents without existing assets is that they must borrow
funds, so the argument requires m > rB. As the surplus in period b+ 1 can
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be achieved at no loss of consumption in period b, such a strategy is always
benecial whenever more consumption is preferred to less (monotonicity).
As the surplus that can be generated in this way is increasing in gib, if an agent
can dissave at a rate less than m, any contribution to the Saving Gateway
other than the maximum cannot be optimal, so gib = g. Alongside investing
the maximum in the Saving Gateway an agent may also optimally choose
to also save/borrow an additional amount in the bank account, where this
amount is determined by the Euler equation for sib in (1).
Turning to period b   1, suppose (1 +m) > (1 + ri)2, then by substituting
the Euler equation for sib into that for s
i
b 1, the optimum must satisfy:
sib 1 : 
2
i (1 + ri)
2 =
U 0[cib 1]
U 0[cib+1]
gib 1 : 
2
i (1 +m) >
U 0[cib 1]
U 0[cib+1]
,
from which it follows that a surplus in b + 1 can again be obtained through
a borrow-to-save strategy in period b   1. Extending this logic yields that
git = g is optimal in period t when it holds that:
1 +m > (1 + ri)
b t+1 : (2)
Since the right-hand side of (2) is decreasing in t, contributing the maximum
to the Saving Gateway account in every period is optimal if (2) is satised
at t = a:
1 +m > (1 + ri)
d : (3)
For d = 24 and m = 0:5 the condition in (3) is met for APRs of less than
22.5 per cent.5 This implies that savers earning the market rate of interest,
5Note that the required rate of 22.5 per cent is the implied rate of return on contribu-
tions to the Saving Gateway in t = a.
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or borrowers able to obtain credit at the rate rB, are predicted to contribute
the maximum to the Saving Gateway in every period.
However, this prediction will not hold for all borrowers. For instance, unse-
cured loans of up to £ 500, targeted at those on low incomes, are presently on
o¤er at APRs in the region of 250-300 per cent.6 At these rates, a borrow-to-
save strategy only becomes operable in the nal three periods of the Saving
Gateway account. Other, so-called paydayloans, are on o¤er at APRs in
excess of 1,500 per cent, for which a borrow-to-save strategy is only operable
at t = b.
For such credit constrained agents, who cannot utilise borrow-to-save strate-
gies, the optimality of investing the maximum in the Saving Gateway is no
longer immediate. Whether the monthly cap gib  g is binding for such
agents depends on their willingness and ability to invest in the Saving Gate-
way out of current income. Suppose at t = b that an agent optimally invests
an amount gib < g in the Saving Gateway (so g
i
b  g is non-binding). Then,
turning to period b   1, by substituting the Euler equation for gib into the
Euler equation for sib 1 I have:
sib 1 : 
2
i (1 + ri) (1 +m) =
U 0[cib 1]
U 0[cib+1]
gib 1 : 
2
i (1 +m) <
U 0[cib 1]
U 0[cib+1]
.
It follows that any assets saved at t = b   1 are optimally held in the bank
account, not the Saving Gateway account. Extending this logic, the optimal
saving path is to save nothing in the Saving Gateway until the nal period,
t = b. More generally, if an agent will have a total of £ 45 to invest in the
Saving Gateway with g = 25, this is optimally invested as £ 0 in t = a; ::; b 2,
£ 20 in t = b  1 and £ 25 in t = b.
6For instance, Provident Financial, one of the UKs largest providers of unsecured loans,
presently o¤ers loans of £ 300 repaid over 52 weeks with a typical APR of 272.2 per cent
(June 2010).
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Summarising this analysis, the use of matching payments for Saving Gateway
accounts implies that the optimal contribution in each period is usually either
nothing or the maximum. This prediction of the model is consistent with
evidence from the Saving Gateway pilots: for instance, Kempson, McKay
and Collard (2005, p. 53) report that in the rst pilot "the two most common
amounts being saved were £ 25 (the maximum) and zero."
The observation that determination of the optimal level of saving in the Sav-
ing Gateway in most cases relies only on arguments relating to the monotonic-
ity of preferences implies that many factors that conventionally inuence
saving decisions - such as time and risk preferences, prudence, and the EIS
- play a much reduced role. While this simplicity is argued by some to be a
virtue, there is a danger that the saving decisions agents face in the Saving
Gateway fail to replicate those they face in the market more generally.
4.2 Asset-holding
To analyse the implications of the Saving Gateway for asset-holding over the
lifecycle I turn to simulation ndings. In each period I calculate the total
holding of assets (Ait) comprising those held both in the bank and Saving
Gateway accounts:
Ait =
8<:
sit t = 1; :::; a  1
sit +
Pt
j=a g
i
j t = a; :::; b
sit t = b+ 1; ::; n
To generate the level of asset-holding that agents make under the do noth-
ingoption I simulate the model without the Saving Gateway (g = 0). The
additional asset-holdings generated by the Saving Gateway are therefore mea-
sured as Ait   Ait jg=0 .
I also compare the impact of the Saving Gateway to that from making a
one-o¤ lump-sum transfer - of an identical amount to the matching payment
- at time t = b through the qualifying benets and credits (the lump-sum
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option). For instance, an agent who would save the maximum under the
Saving Gateway option receives a £ 300 transfer under the lump-sum option.
To ensure full comparability between options I assume that, as for the Saving
Gateway, agents become aware of the future transfer only in t = a.
Because the lump-sum option generates a pure wealth e¤ect of an identical
size to that under the Saving Gateway, di¤erences in outcomes between the
two options (Ait   Ait jy ) can be interpreted as behavioural (substitution)
e¤ects arising from the Saving Gateway scheme, separate from wealth ef-
fects. The distinction is of importance as, if the Saving Gateway is only a
transfer from government to those on low incomes, aggregate saving across
government and households is unchanged.
Figures 1a-1c show asset-holding under the do nothing, Saving Gateway,
and lump-sum options for, respectively, savers, borrowers, and the credit
constrained. Several aspects are noteworthy. First, since Figures 1a-1c do
not break down saving in the two accounts separately, it is necessary to clar-
ify that all three types nd it optimal to invest the maximum in the Saving
Gateway account in each period. Indeed, the simulation results suggest that
only those who are credit constrained and additionally very strongly disin-
clined to save, and/or with extremely low incomes, do not nd it optimal
to invest the maximum. Second, for all types, there is a discernible spike
in asset-holding in period b + 1, which reects the receipt of the matching
payment.
Third, for savers and borrowers (Figures 1a-1b), the Saving Gateway is asso-
ciated with a reduction in asset-holding during the life of the Saving Gateway
account. For there to be positive saving in the Saving Gateway account and
also a reduction in total asset holdings, requires that, on the optimal saving
path, every £ 1 saved in the Saving Gateway is associated with more than £ 1
dissaved in the bank account. That asset-holding actually falls is a stronger
nding than that implied by the pure borrow-to-save strategy discussed in
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Emmerson and Wakeeld (2003), under which every £ 1 saved in the Saving
Gateway is precisely o¤set by £ 1 dissaved elsewhere.7
By comparison with the lump-sum option, the nding can be seen to arise
from the wealth e¤ect of the matching payments: the logic of consumption
smoothing demands that if an agent knows they will receive a matching
payment - which will increase future consumption - then this should be an-
ticipated by increasing present consumption.
The prediction that asset-holding falls during the life of the Saving Gateway
is consistent with the failure of the evaluation of the second Saving Gateway
pilot to detect evidence of an increase in net worth among pilot participants
(Harvey et al., 2007). A further implication of the analysis is that the in-
centive to increase present consumption must fade the lower is the match
rate (which determines the extent of increased future consumption). This
prediction is consistent with evidence from US experiments into IDAs, which
nds an inverse relationship between saving and the match rate (Schreiner,
2001).
A fourth observation (again for savers and borrowers) is that, were Saving
Gateway balances to attract the market rate of interest in addition to the
government match, the impact of the scheme would be identical to that
under the lump-sum option. As, however, I assume no interest is paid on
Saving Gateway balances, the Saving Gateway is predicted to generate a
small behavioural e¤ect - but importantly this e¤ect acts to reduce asset-
holding. As such, aggregate saving is predicted to fall in such cases. The
lump-sum option is able to dominate the Saving Gateway in the sense that,
at the same cost, it generates greater asset holdings in every period t  a.
7Closer inspection of Figures 1a and 1b also shows that borrowers dissave in the bank
account more sharply than do savers, despite facing a higher cost of capital. Also, the
severity of asset switching increases over the life of the Saving Gateway account, peaking
at maturity.
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Last, the ndings for savers and borrowers discussed above do not hold for
the credit constrained. For these agents (Figure 1c) the Saving Gateway
is associated with increased asset-holding as agents now nd it optimal to
nance contributions to the Saving Gateway through additional saving (re-
duced consumption). Because the credit constrained are assumed not to not
save under do nothing, all assets held in the Saving Gateway represent gen-
uinely additional asset-holding as a result of participation in the scheme. The
Saving Gateway therefore dominates the lump-sum option in the sense that
it generates greater asset holdings in every period t  a.
To summarise this analysis, whether the Saving Gateway is observed to in-
crease or decrease asset-holding during the life of the Saving Gateway account
hinges on an agents access to credit: agents with access to credit hold fewer
assets than under do nothing, while the credit constrained hold greater.
Beyond the life of the Saving Gateway account, all agent types experience
higher asset holdings over the remainder of the lifecycle relative to under do
nothing, so the scheme achieves a measure of success from an asset-based
welfare perspective. However, for unconstrained savers and borrowers an
equivalent e¤ect can be achieved under the lump-sum option for a smaller
subsidy than under the Saving Gateway. Only for the credit constrained does
the e¤ect outweigh that arising under the lump-sum option.
4.3 Consumption
If the aim of kick-starting a savings habitis met, agents will be observed
to increase their saving out of current income beyond the life of the Saving
Gateway account. In the absence of a change in income, this necessarily
implies a reduction in consumption (relative to under do nothing).
Figure 2 shows the change in consumption attributable to the Saving Gate-
way, cit  cit  cit jg=0 , over the lifecycle. For both savers and borrowers cit
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is positive for all periods t > a. Therefore, rather than consumption being
predicted to fall after participation in the Saving Gateway, the model pre-
dicts the opposite behavioural response. Moreover, consumption rises from
the moment the Saving Gateway account is opened, not only after it has
matured. The ndings are due in a straightforward way to the wealth e¤ect
arising from the receipt of the matching payment.
The picture is, however, somewhat di¤erent for the credit constrained (Figure
2), for whom the Saving Gateway is associated with a reduction in consump-
tion during the life of the account. However, this temporary reduction in
consumption is reversed by the wealth e¤ect once the Saving Gateway ac-
count matures. Therefore, irrespective of credit constraints, the model nds
no evidence to suggest that the Saving Gateway is associated with subsequent
falls in consumption.
4.4 Prior E¤ects
Thus far, the analysis has assumed that agents do not anticipate their future
participation in the Saving Gateway in advance of opening their account.
However, if agents anticipate their future eligibility, or if they choose to wait
before opening their account (perhaps to rst build-up a stock of assets), this
assumption is violated.
To examine the implications of such prior anticipation, I simulate a version of
the model in which agents anticipate their future participation in the Saving
Gateway in period p, where p < a. The results shown here assume that
participation is anticipated by a year, such that p = a  12. Figure 3 shows
the predictions of the model for savers. Under anticipation asset-holding does
not only fall during the life of the Saving Gateway account, but from t = p,
the period in which participation is rst anticipated. Comparing Figure 1a
(no anticipation) with Figure 3, it can be seen that the e¤ect of anticipation
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is to exacerbate the fall in asset-holding associated with the Saving Gateway
during the life of the account.
The qualitative result for borrowers under anticipation is identical to that
for savers. However, for credit constrained agents, anticipation provides an
opportunity to build-up a stock of assets before opening a Saving Gateway
account. As such, the Saving Gateway is associated with increased asset-
holding between t = p and t = a. However, because the credit constrained
then enter the Saving Gateway with positive assets, they are able to nance
some proportion of their contributions through asset switching rather than
through reduced consumption. The principal e¤ect is therefore one of timing:
some accumulation of assets is brought forward to the period prior to the
opening of the Saving Gateway account.
5 Habit Formation
One reason that might explain the failure of the model to predict lower
consumption upon the maturity of the Saving Gateway account is that the
specication of preferences employed so far assumes no latent dependency
between consumption choices today and those made in previous periods,
despite the presumption of such a dependency being a key motivator of the
design of the Saving Gateway.
The e¤ect of habit formation on decision making is discussed in the eco-
nomics literature as far back as Marshall (1890) and Duesenberry (1949).
The concept provides a theoretical explanation of the excess sensitivity (Con-
stantinides, 1990), and equity-premium (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) puz-
zles. The most common specication of habit formation is to write utility as
U

cit   
cit 1

.8 The parameter 
 measures the strength of habit formation
8Studies employing this specication include Muellbauer (1988), Carroll and Weil
(1994), Alessie and Lusardi (1997), Guariglia and Rossi (2002), Angelini (2009) and Alessie
and Teppa (2010).
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in preferences. If 
 is positive utility exhibits habit formation in the tradi-
tional sense, and higher values of 
 imply a stronger role for habits. If 

is negative then utility exhibits what Deaton (1992) terms durability, in the
sense that not only current, but also past consumption generates utility.9
Despite its prominence in the theoretical literature, empirical evidence of
habit formation in consumption decisions is weak and inconclusive. For habit
formation to resolve the excess sensitivity of consumption requires 
 to be at
least 0.8 (Constantinides, 1990). However, empirical estimates of 
 vary from

 =  0:25 (Guariglia and Rossi, 2002) to 
 = 0:21 (Alessie and Teppa, 2010),
with many studies being unable to distinguish 
 from zero (e.g. Dynan,
2000). It is unclear, therefore, that habit formation in consumption decisions
is su¢ ciently robust an empirical phenomenon to justify being a centrepiece
of government saving policy.
This concern notwithstanding, I simulate the model with habit formation
preferences. To take account of the spread of the empirical estimates, I run
simulations for both 
 = 0:25. The earlier analysis (that does not allow
for habit formation) corresponds to 
 = 0. I calculate the di¤erence between
asset-holding under the Saving Gateway and that under do nothing, i.e.
Ait  Ait   Ait jg=0 . Estimates using 
 =  0:25 are labelled Ai t , while
those using 
 = 0:25 are labelled Ai+t . I also compare outcomes under the
Saving Gateway to those under the lump-sum option (Ait jy = Ait Ait jy ).
Figure 4a shows results for (AS t ;A
S
t ;A
S+
t ) and the corresponding three
measures under the lump-sum option. The reader could be forgiven for think-
ing that Figure 4a depicted only two lines, for to a very close approximation,
the policy impact, whether under the Saving Gateway or under the lump-sum
option, is invariant to the three possible settings of 
. As such, the earlier
9A related approach to modelling the formation of a savings habit is Becker and Mur-
phys (1988) economic model of rational addiction. However, addiction may be too strong
a paradigm in the case of saving, which is not known for being overtly addictive.
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analysis of Section 4, which assumes 
 = 0, is robust to plausible levels of
either habit formation or durability.
In interpreting this nding, it is important to understand that allowing for
habit formation does have a quantitatively signicant impact on predicted
levels of asset-holding over the lifecycle. In particular, positive values of 

are associated with higher levels of asset-holding over the lifecycle. However,
because this level e¤ect is common to both Ait and A
i
t jg=0 , it is eliminated
in the calculation of Ait, from which the nding follows.
Figure 4b depicts the results for the credit constrained (ACC t andA
CC+
t ).
Although in this case there is a visually discernible di¤erence in outcomes
between the two settings - higher asset-holding for t  a is predicted under
habit formation than under durability - the e¤ect is still quantitatively small,
and does not alter the qualitative implications of the analysis using 
 = 0.
In the case of savers, how large would 
 have to be before a discernible dif-
ference arises between AS t and A
S+
t ? Figure 5 depicts the model for

 = 0:5 (twice the range of 
 found empirically). While a visually dis-
cernible di¤erence becomes present, the e¤ect remains quantitatively small.
As discussed in Section 2, a more radical alternative view is that participation
in the Saving Gateway is able to alter agents preferences. Consistent with
the aim of the Saving Gateway to kick-start a saving habitI analyse the case
whereby agents experience an unanticipated preference change - from 
 = 0
to 
 = 0:25 - during their participation in the Saving Gateway. Qualitatively
similar results obtain if the preference change is assumed to be from 
 =
 0:25 to 
 = 0. The preference change is assumed to occur at time t = c,
where, for simplicity, I take c to be halfway through the Saving Gateway
account (c = (a+ b)=2).
Figure 6 depicts asset-holding by borrowers under the Saving Gateway op-
tion, both under taste-change (denoted Ait j ), and with xed preferences.
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Allowing for taste change is seen to generate higher predictions for asset-
holding in all periods t  c. Moreover, beyond t = b the di¤erence in the
predicted levels of asset-holding is seen to grow continuously over almost
the entire remaining lifecycle, implying that under taste change the model
predicts lower levels of consumption beyond the life of the Saving Gateway
account.
Summarising this analysis, on its own, introducing plausible degrees of habit
formation or durability into preferences generates too small an e¤ect to in-
uence, either quantitatively or qualitatively, the analysis of the previous
section. As such, habit formation e¤ects would not appear to warrant their
centrepiece role in the rationale for the Saving Gateway. If, however, par-
ticipation in the Saving Gateway is able to raise an agents value of 
, the
impact of the Saving Gateway becomes somewhat more di¤erent to that gen-
erated by a pure wealth e¤ect, even in the absence of credit constraints: the
scheme generates greater asset-holding and lower consumption than when 

is assumed xed.
6 Conclusion
The principal aim of the Saving Gateway is to kick-start a saving habitfor
those on low incomes. This paper embeds a Saving Gateway account in a
simple lifecycle model of saving in order to assess the predictions of economic
theory for the schemes impact on saving behaviour.
While saving behaviour inevitably depends on a wide range of factors, the
analysis highlights the importance of an agents access to credit in explaining
optimal saving behaviour with respect to the Saving Gateway. The scheme
nds support for agents who are credit constrained. For such agents the Sav-
ing Gateway creates additional asset-holding over and above that observed
under the lump-sum option, and results in asset-holding by agents who would
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optimally hold no assets under the do nothingoption. However, even for
this group, the model o¤ers no reason to suggest that the fall in consumption
observed during the life of the Saving Gateway account will pertain beyond
the life of the account: the prediction is indeed the opposite.
However, for agents with access to credit, the Saving Gateway has a di¤erent
impact on optimal saving. I show that for such agents the Saving Gateway is
associated with a fall in asset-holding during the life of the Saving Gateway
account and a rise in consumption from the period in which the account
is opened. Although asset-holdings are increased over the remainder of the
lifecycle as the matching payment is gradually consumed - supporting the
principle of asset-based welfare - an equivalent e¤ect can be generated at
lower cost under the lump-sum option.
Habit e¤ects, which are at the heart of the rationale for the Saving Gateway,
appear to generate only quantitatively insignicant e¤ects on saving behav-
iour. On their own, these e¤ects seem too small to justify the implementation
of the scheme.
The case for the Saving Gateway therefore appears to rely on either it being
able to alter agents fundamental preferences towards saving (as in Figure 6),
or it being carefully targeted only at the credit-constrained: agents with prior
savings and/or access to credit would be excluded. The former argument
would suggest a role for nancial education, while the latter would suggest
a role for an assets test as a part of the eligibility criteria, possibly coupled
with the use of third party information from credit rating agencies.
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Figure 1b: Asset-holding (borrowers)
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Figure 1c: Asset-holding (credit constrained)
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Figure 2: Change in consumption
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Figure 3: Asset-holding under anticipation at t = p (savers)
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Figure 4a: Change in asset-holding with habit formation/durability
preferences (savers)
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Figure 4b: Change in asset-holding with habit formation/durability
preferences (credit constrained)
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Figure 5: Change in asset-holding with 
 = 0:5 (savers)
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Figure 6: Change in asset-holding with preference change at t = c
(borrowers)
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